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THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLURALISM* 
by 
CHAJM: PERELMAN 
Like most philosophical notions, the notion of "pluralism." as opposed to 
"monism" is confused since, when used in different contexts, its meaning and 
scope change. 
Although our everyday experience reveals a variety of different beings and 
phenomena, the birth of Western metaphysics is to be traced to the great poem 
of Parmenides, who sets against this multiplicity of appearances an eternal and 
uniform reality conforming to the demands of reason. Parmenides' philosophy 
takes the form of an ontological monism which by treating them as appearances 
disqualifies all phenomena whose existence we commonly accept. 
Monotheism, which states that there is but one true God who pervades 
the whole universe or who is the creator of everything that exists, is a fonn of 
monism which considers as mere idols the very many divinities of primitive 
religions. The philosophical concept of this unique God recognizes in Him a 
perfect being, a model of human reason and a guarantee of every truth. Accord­
ing to St. Augustine human knowledge shall be understood as only a pale and 
imperfect reflection of divine knowledge. For centuries, the learned man's ideal 
has been to discover the truth that God knows through all eternity. 
The idea that God kno.ws the solution to all moral problems, that there 
exists a just solution, known to God, for any [problem of behaviour has fostered 
axiological monism, namely the idea that in any conflict of values there is a 
way of reconciling all differences of opinion by reducing all values with their 
infinite diversity to one single value designated in terms of perfection, useful­
ness or truth. The various phenomena and values will be regarded merely as 
aspects of a basic reality and they will be arranged in a hierarchy and system­
atized in an unambigious fashion. In this perspective, all conflicts among men 
arise from the fact that they do not allow th�mselves to be led by reason alone, 
but are influenced by their imagination, their interests and their passions. Spin­
oza's phHosophy, a prototype of a monist philosophy, stat>es in Ethics (Book 
IV, proposition 69) that he is free who is led by reason alone and since freedom 
is conformity to reason. what reason counsels to one man, it advises also to all 
men (Book IV, proposition 72). Therefore free men cannot but agree among 
themselves. 
Ontological or axiological monism will most often be associated with a 
methodological monism according to which there is but one method t.o follow 
to reach the truth. This is the demonstrative method used by mathematicians 
which should in all areas provide us with the same certainty as is provided by 
mathematical knowledge. 
The last monism I wish to mention is the sociological monism which en­
visages the relationship of an individual to society along the same lines as his 
relationship to a single God. For sociologists like Emile Durkheim the rules, 
which conscience commands everyone to obey, would not be God's command­
ments, but injunctions of the collective conscience, an expression of the soc­
iety where they live. From this point of view, the state, namely a politically and 
legally organized nation, would instill into all its members through tradition and 
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education, the whole range of recognized values and compulsory behaviours, by 
specifying for each member of that society what is forbidden, ordered, and 
desirable. 
The advantage of monism in all its various forms is that it provides in every 
sphere a systematized and rationalized conception of the universe, thus securing 
a single and true solution to all conflicts and differences of opinion. 
The drawback to monist ideQlogies is that they promote a reductionism 
which is sometimes barely tolerable. When they do not succeed in persuading 
everybody of the truth of their point of view, they may justify coercion and the 
use of force against the recalcitrants in the name of God, of reason, of truth, 
or of the state's or party's interests. Those who resist have to be reeducated, 
and if they do not allow themselves to be persuaded, they must be punished 
for their obstinacy and reluctance. 
The religious wars which bathed Europe in blood during the 16th century, 
first led to a political compromise recognizing the right of each prince to deter­
mine the religion of his subjects ( cujus regio, ejus religio) and then brought 
about some religious tolerance. 
The fight for human rights, for freedom of thought and speech, for reli­
gious and politi.cal freedom, associated with the progress of democratic spirit, 
has led 20th century thinkers to oppose to monist philosophies pluralistically 
inspired ones. Having suffered from totalitarianisms of the left and of tbe right 
and having witnessed the abuses resulting from a combination of monist ideolo­
gies with the use of force to impose them, theorists of democratic  regimes have 
developed various pluralist ideologies which make the concrete individual the 
starting point of their investigation. 
One of the most striking and fertile philosophies in this respect is the 
doctrine developed by my teacher Professor Eugene Dupree! (1879-1967). Its 
application to both political and economic problems has been discussed in a 
little book published just after the last war and entitled "Le Pluralisme Socio­
logique". I 
Instead of setting off the individual against society as if they were entities 
independent of each other, Dupree! bases his general sociology on the idea of 
the social relationship which "exists between two individuals when the existence 
or activity of one of them influences the acts or psychological condition of the 
other. A reciprocal influence, actual or virtual, is the normal case". 2 
To be able to influence others ·a typical feature of social relationship- to 
achieve the desired result one will resort sometimes to coercion, sometimes to 
persuasion and sometimes to an exchange of goods and services. He who poss­
esses this ability to influence the actions and feelings of others through one of 
the above means or a combination of them is endowed with a social power o f  
variable size. 
Social relationships are quite varied; their duration and nature are quite 
different. They are positive if they are based on agreement, consent or coopera­
tion . .  They are negative if one of their components is opposition, conflict or 
competition. While any positive social relationship increases in some way the 
social power of each of the parties, a negative relationship is destructive of soc­
ial power. Social relationships of opposite signs may coexist, e.g. sports com­
petitions between clubs which cooperate within national and international 
federations. 
Two social relationships interpenetrate each other if they include a com­
mon term. In such a case one of these relationships will be complimentary to 
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the other if it strongly influences either the existence or the nature of the latter. 
Because the judge exerts an authority over the policeman, he exerts an influ­
ence over the defendant, the first of these relationships being complementary 
to the second. 3 
By means of the concept of complementary social relationship, Dup�el 
defines another basic notion, the notion of a social group. A social group or 
society is a collection of individuals united together and distin�ished from other 
individuals by positive and complementary social relationships. 4 
Families, nations, religions, universities, sports teams, professions, etc. are 
such social groups. Social relationships among groups .vary greatly depending 
on whether these are of the same nature or heterogenous. Normally groups of a 
similar kind are external to each other, having no common members, whereas 
heterogenous groups most often have common members. These groups are said 
to live in symbiosis. 
Sociological pluralism results from the fact that individuals are simultan­
eously part of several groups which sometimes cooperate and at other times 
oppose each other. Each group seeks to signal its existence and whenever possi­
ble its autonomy. The spiritual life with its own peculiarities expresses itself 
largely by the way the individual arranges his or her participation in social life, 
with all these groups living in symbiosis, each group seeking that individual's 
cooperation and calling on his or her loyalty and solidarity. 
It is thanks to sociological pluralism that notions so central to moral phil· 
osophy as freedom and individual responsibility can be explained. 
The newborn child is raised like a young animal. He spontaneously imi­
tates his parents and those who surround him. He is taught the behaviours which 
conform lo the habits and rules.. of the group. Through signs of approval or dis­
approval, he will know what behaviour is expected of him and what is condemn­
ed. The more a society is homogenous and isolated from outside influences, the 
more it will be conformist and traditional. But as soon as society is diversified 
and the individual integrates into a plurality of groups living in symbiosis, then 
conflicts are bound to occur when the rules of two groups in which an individual 
simultaneously participates prove to be incompatible. The typical case is that of 
an individual who is part of both a national group and a religious groull which no 
longer blend in deveTop�d societies. What should he do if the national group 
drafts him into the army while the religious group forbids him to kill and even 
sometimes to carry arms? Faced with these incompatible orders, the individual 
is forced to make a choice. If he behaves as a good citizen, he will violate his 
religious sect's prescriptions and vice-versa. It is with such a conflict that a con­
scientious objector is faced. Rather than conforming to the requirements of one 
or other of the groups in which he participates, he is often led to take a position 
toward them. He will have to make comparisons, to make judgements on the 
rules of the groups from the vantage point of a value which transcends the con­
ventions of one group or the other. In this way, in opposition to the closed soc­
iety, universalist ideals are developed, (ideals of the open society, as Bergson 
calls them), and the individual, who no longer completely identifies with any 
group of which he is a part, acquires a certain consistency of his own. His auto­
nomy, his freedom and the development of his conscience are a result of soc­
iological pluralism, since he no longer identifies entirely with one of the groups 
of which he is a member. It may be that, as in the case of Antigone, hEI rebels 
against the orders of an authority which he deems unacceptable. It may be also 
that a man, placed in a difficult situation, initiates efforts to eliminate incom-
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patibilities, to reduce the connicts which threaten to develop between groups 
living in symbiosis and of which he is a member. 5 
Social life consists not only of efforts at cooperation but also of conflicts 
between individuals and between groups which tend to dominate, to establish 
hierarchies and sometimes to annihilate the opponent. 
The history of mankind, after long periods of disorder and violence, has 
led to the development of a remarkable institution, the politically and legally 
structured state to which is entrusted the monopoly of the use of force within its 
boundaries. Individuals and groups have renounced in principle the right to de· 
fend their interests through force of arms and take justice into their own hands. 
It is the establishment of the legal structure of the state with it<; courts, its po· 
lice force and its army, which has underlain international public order since the 
Middle Ages. 
In the pluralist conception, the state can efficiently fulfill its role as the 
guardian of order and as an arbitrator between individuals and groups Jiving in 
symbiosis on its territory only by not identifying itself with any one of these. 
Over the years other missions have been added to the liberal conception of the 
state as guardian of order, es.sentially those missions which individuals and 
groups are unable to perform or which they perform in an imperfect fashion. 
But if the state should identify itself with anyone of the existing groups by assu­
ming the interests and aspirations of such a group, it is likely that it will not be 
able to perform its crucial mission, that of being __ the guardian of order, vested 
with the monopoly of the use of armed force . When the state -a group based 
on power- adopts an ideology or religion, or wields economic power, it tends 
to become a totalitarian group tolerating neither independent groups nor indiv­
iduals unwilling to obey its orders. It may wish to dictate to all those who live 
within its boundaries the truths they should abide by and the ideals they should 
pursue. The head of such a state, if he is not equated wi th a providential and 
omniscient god, will be at least treated as a providential man whose words and 
deeds cannot be challenged. This monism which makes the leader the source of 
all truth and values, will be accompanied by a contempt for human rights as 
well as by persecution of all groups claiming to lead an e�istence independent 
of the government of the state. No human aspirations,whether national or reli­
gious. scientific or artistic, economic or recreational, will be promoted or even 
tolerated unless they serve the objectives of the central power. They will be 
subject to this fundamental consideration, which serves as a general criterion. 
This criterion will be defined and interpreted by the only re·cognized authority 
-that which holds the power· and by those who derive directly from it. In the 
totalitarian state, the monism of values complements the ideological arsenal of 
the central power. Most often this is associated with the monopoly of comm· 
unications media; the state alone wishes to hold social power. Any opposition 
is considered revolutionary and, consequently it can fight only by recourse to 
force organ ized sometimes within, sometimes outside the state. 
The pluralist state, however, is based on respect for individuals and for 
the many groups which sometimes cooperate with each other and sometimes 
oppose one another. It recognizes that the exercise of rights and freedom may 
have some drawbacks and create trouble: the state's function is not to suppress 
these liberties, but to moderate their most dangerous excesses. This pluralism 
renounces any aspiration to a perfect order based upon a single criterion. Rather, 
it recognizes the existence of a pluralism made up of incompatible values. Hence 
the need for reasonable compromises resulting from a permanent dialogue and 
a comparison of opposing views. 
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The social and political life of a democratic society -along with freedom of 
belief, freedom of the press, and freedom of meeting and association, whi<:h 
keep it alive- offers a well known form of sociological pluralism. Each one of 
these freedoms may obviously create abuses and infringements upon the rights 
and freedoms of others. ][t is up to the lawmakers, to the courts and to the juris­
prudence to establish and maintain a balance, always delicate, between legiti­
mate claims. In each situation, it is a matter of seeking a solution which is 
acceptable, reasonable and fair because it is well balanced. 
You will note that the terms employed to describe these solutions corres­
pond to vague notions which cannot be expressed in quantifiable figures. These 
notions derive from such heterogeneous elements as the rights of individuals and 
groups, the proper operation of institutions, general welfare, fairness and social 
usefulness, protection of the weak, social trust based on expectations, respect 
for traditions and a concern for innovation and for social and t.echnical progress. 
Pluralism is not at its best with precise and quantifiable rules as these imply 
the reduction of one value to another, and of heterogeneity to homogeneity. 
On the contrary, respect for diversity implies a search for solutions adapted to 
situations whose elements may vary from time to time requiring a sensitivity to 
all existing values. A judge who is accorded a power of evaluation in performing 
his duties must not follow his subjective views, but rather try to reflect those 
shared by the enlightened members of the society in which he lives and by the 
views and traditions prevailing in his professional milieu. Indeed, a judge called 
upon to give a legal opinion in a specific case must attempt to render a judgment 
acceptable to the higher courts and to an enlightened public opinion as well as 
being acceptable, in the case of a Supreme Court judgment, to the legislature 
whicb will not fail to react if ii considers the Supreme Court's decision unaccept­
able. 6 
It should be noted in this connection that the power of evaluation or dis­
cretion granted to both the judiciary and the executive branch implies that the 
competent authority may choose from among a number of options that whieh 
has its approval. But this power of evaluation, this discretion, always has certain 
limits. Every time a decision appears unreasonable it will be considered as an 
intolerable abuse of power. 
We should note that what is reasonable or unreasonable in a given society 
at a specific stage of its development may cease to be so in another environment 
or at another b. Consider,, for ex:am?e, the motivalion of the Belgium Supreme Chuit 
in a decision of November 11, 1889 concerning the admission of women to the 
legal profession. A Belgian woman meeting all requirements of the law had re­
quested her admission to the Bar by arguing that Section 6 of the Belgian Con· 
stitution proclaimed the equality of all Belgians before the law and that no pro­
vision had expressly prohibited the access of women to the Bar. To this request, 
the first in Belgian history, the Court replied that "if the legislator has not ex­
cluded women from the Bar by a formal provision, this was due to the fact that 
it held as a truism too obvious to need to be expressed that the administration 
of justice was reserved for men". 
A statement wllich looked obvious nearly a century ago, would seem not 
only unreasonable but even ridiculous today. Let me state, by the way, that it 
was not until April 7, 1922 that the Belgian legislature set aside the reasons 
invoked in 1889 and allowed women to practise law. 7 
Insofar as law is seen as an expression of national will, it is natural that it 
should appear to be a collective work, based on custom and on general principles 
53 
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developerl over the years but which could be formulated and interpreted differ· 
ently in different systems. Most of the time, law will be the work of a collective 
law maker and democratic systems see to it that it is applied by judges 
indepen4ent ot the executive branch before whom it is advisable that opposing 
views be argued by competent lawyers. In important matters, a single jud2e will 
be replaced by a tribunal consisting of several justices or by a common jury. 
Provision is usually made for actions before an appeal court and a supreme court, 
so that a judgment in a lower court does not acquire the authority of a �  iudi· 
cata until it has been subjected to several reviews. 
Such a variety of precautions is unknown in mathematics or natural sci· 
1:11ce. This is because methods of reasoning in law are of a quite different nature 
depending normally neither on simple observation nor on formal proof. Plural­
ism, as it is manifested in politics, in law and in morality cannot be envisaged 
without a methodological pluralism. For the plur11lity of disciplines there corres­
ponds a plurality of methods. This is what Aristotle observed in a famous frag­
ment of Nicoma� Ethics: "Precision is not to be sought for alike in all dis­
cussions any more than in all the products of the crafts .. .it is evidently equally 
foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician as to demand from a 
rhetorician scientific proofs" (Book 1, 1094b) " ... for a carpenter and a geometer 
investigate the right angle in different ways: the former does so insofar as the 
right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is" (Book 1, 1098a). 
Aristotle, who is the father of formal logic, stressed the fact that beside 
analytical reasoning used in demonstrations, one must recognize the existence 
of dialectical reasoning used in dialogues and controversies as wen as in those 
situations in which one attempts to persuade and convince by argumentation. 
He examined these forms o f  reasoning in his well known Rhetoric and claimed 
to be the first to discuss the techniques of controversy in his Tlpi�. 
Indeed, when it is a matter of deliberating and judging, se ectmg and decid­
ing, the reasons given for or against do not constitute constraining proofs but 
arguments which are more or less strong, more or less relevant, more or less con­
vincing. But what seems to be a good argument for one person may seem to be 
worthless for another. A convincing speech must be adapted to the audience that 
has to be convinced, as this • con�ction comes from what the audience oonredes. 
The orator who does not follow this basic rule is bound to make the most serious 
mistake in argumentation, petitio principii, or begging the question. 8 
Monist philosophers have always attempted to reduce the plurality of op­
posing views to the uniqueness of truth. To achieve this, they have imagined a 
divine reason, a guarantee of truth and justice, of which the human reason is a 
mere reflection. This eternal and unchangeable reason, by giving recognition to 
the self-evidence of certain propositions would thus guarantee their truth, this 
being in tum accepted by all reasonable beings. Thus, for rationalists such as 
Descartes or Spinoza, the geometer's method which proceeds by intuition and 
demonstration would serve as a model for the solution of all human problems, 
rules that are valid in mathematics being applicable to all areas. But before one 
begins to fbilosophize and to seek the required solution, it is first necessary to purge one s mind of all passions, emotions, concerns and fancies, indeed of all 
those prejudices which fill the mind. 
In order to be able, under the guidance of reason, to share the same truths, 
men must also forget their beliefs and creeds, the heritage of history, tradition 
and culture , all equally disqualified as prejudices. This would be the utopia o f  
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the universal society based oo reason, the avowed ideal of the French Revolution. 
But it  is known that this ideal of universal brotherhood was a prelude to 
the revolutionary and the Napoleonic wars. And even the Code Napoleon, that 
most worthy work of this rationalistic spirit, appears today as but the incarna­
tion of bourgeois ideology at the beginning of the 19th century. 
Consequently we should ask whether pluralist philosophy must dispense 
with the ideas of truth and reason. 
The idea of truth should serve as a criterion for opruom; but ooly t.o the ex· 
tent that the techniques of control and verification allow it to be appropriately 
used without attempting t,o impose questionable ideologies in the name of truth. 
As for the idea of reason, pluralism does not see it as an eternal and un· 
changing faculty shared by all men and separate from all other faculties as well 
as from history, but considers it to be an ideal of universality peculiar to western 
philosophy. The appeal to reason whose philosophical tradition goes back to 
the Greeks should be envisaged as an appeal to agreement by all men who are 
not disqualified as members of this universal audience. Striving to convince this 
universal audience by his discourses and writings -the greatest effort which may 
be required from a philosopher- the orator must renounce persuasive techniques 
and arguments which are not likely to win the agreement of that audience. To 
appeal to reason is to submit to the exacting demands that Kant imposed on 
moral action; that is to conform to the categorical imperative according to which 
only arguments which can be universally admitted shall be used. But it is ob­
vious that in philosophical pluralism, unlike classical rationalism, the idea of rea­
son is not limited only to those reasoning. methods used by mathematicians. 
Each philosopher elaborates this ideal of rationality in his own way, in line with 
what he holds to be acceptable to the universal audience. 9 
This idea, or rather this ideal, that each philosopher holds, must always 
be subject to the test of experiment, that is to say to dialogue. 
Monist rationalism, hav)ng recourse to self-evident facts, is thus able to 
proceed directly from the consent of one to the consent of all by disqualifying 
those who do not share lhe same self-evident ideas. However, as debate is never 
compelling, a philosopher proficient in pluralism will admit that different rea­
soning may correspond to the changing view one has of the universal audience. 
lnstead of aspiring to impose an eternal truth, the pluralist philosopher has lesser 
pretentions; he is satisfied with presenting a view of the world which seems rea­
sonable to him and, as such, likely to win the agreement of the universal aud­
ience. This is only an imperfect endeavour al.though it is capable of being im­
proved upon through dialogue and debate. 10 To the extent that he believes 
that they can be generalized, it is the opinions and aspirations of his milieu that 
inspire a philosopher's efforts. 
Keeping open the possibility for such a dialogue favours a conception of 
society which allows everyone to participate; this is yet anoth�r argument with 
which philosophical pluralism could support those who present themselves as 
champions of human rights.• 11· Having as its starting point the concrete human 
being engaged in social relationships and groups of all kinds, philosophical plural­
ism refrains from granting to any individual or group, no matter who they are, 
the exorbitant privilege of setting up a single criterion for what is valid and what 
is appropriate -a privilege that can lead only to excess and totalitarianism, as it 
is likely to oppress and suppress other individuals and other groups equally wor­
thy of respect. 
Philosophical pluralism demands a search for moderate and thus well-bal-
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anced solutions to all conflicts which it considers nevertheless as unavoidable 
and recurring . Under the sign of reasonableness, pluralism does not claim to pro­
vide the perfect, unique and final solution, but simply human solutions --a<npt­
able but capable of being changed and improved-- t.o the ever-recurring problems 
created by the coexistence of men and groups, who prefer a fair compromise to 
the coercion imposed in the name of a unique value Jrrespective of how impor­
tant or even pre-eminent that value may be. 
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